Passenger Vehicle Quota Lottery & Auction

🤖 AI-generated summary · ◆ 1 sourced claim · 🔎 Last verified

This overview was generated with AI from the public sources listed below and checked against them before publication. It has not had a complete human fact-check — treat it as a starting point and follow the sources.

1 sourced claim on this page, none individually verified yet — turn on “Sources in the text” to see each one.

How this atlas is made · What “last verified” means · What “source-checked” means · The full record behind this page

Half of Guangzhou's new car plates come from a lottery, half from auction — a hybrid neither Beijing nor Shanghai uses, still running in 2026, though research finds it mostly buys buyers a second car.

Evidence🔬 Peer-reviewed
what does this mean?The strongest source behind this entry is an independent peer-reviewed or academic study. It grades who did the looking — not how well the project went. All four grades →
Scale🏙️ City-wide

Part of 1001 Smart Cities — 1,167 documented projects · 🏙️ 7 more in Guangzhou · 🚦 Traffic management guide · 🚲 Mobility projects

Since 2012 Guangzhou has capped new passenger-car registrations through a monthly quota split between a free lottery and a paid online auction, administered through the city's Small and Medium Passenger Vehicle Quota Regulation Office — unlike Beijing's pure lottery or Shanghai's pure auction. Roughly half the quota was originally set aside for lottery, most of the rest for bidding (minimum bids around ¥10,000 per plate in recent rounds), with a reserved share for new-energy vehicles. The system is still running: Guangzhou allocated tens of thousands of ordinary-vehicle indicators through lottery and bidding as recently as its November 2025 and April 2026 rounds. An academic study of the scheme found its lottery and auction channels distribute the burden of the cap unevenly between applicants, and the restriction has not stopped car ownership from growing — buyers who lose a lottery or can't afford a winning bid often register a second household car instead.

Live 📅 since 2012

📊 Impact

An academic study of the scheme found its lottery and auction channels distribute the burden of the cap unevenly between applicants, and the restriction has not stopped car ownership from growing — buyers who lose a lottery or can't afford a winning bid often register a second household car instead.

🎓 Lesson

A cap on new plates is not the same as a cap on cars per household — the two China-published evaluations of this scheme both point to substitution, not restraint, as the main behavioral response.

Sources

↗ CarNewsChina (press)Published 11 July 20122012 policy launch: hybrid lottery+auction quota design, distinct from Beijing/Shanghai.
↗ China Daily (press)Published 27 August 2012First lottery results, August 2012 (6,544 winners), confirms lottery launch mechanics.
↗ Guangzhou Municipal Government (official)November 2025 bidding-round notice: 17,712 indicators allocated, ¥10,000 minimum bid — confirms the system is still live.
↗ ScienceDirect (peer-reviewed, abstract)Published December 2017Academic study on the distributional effects of Guangzhou's combined lottery/auction system; full text paywalled, abstract and citation confirm findings referenced here.

📅 How old is the evidence?

Two clocks, kept apart: when this entry’s sources were published, and what has happened to its record in the atlas. Documented span: since 2012. 3 of 4 sources carry a publication date, from 11 July 2012 to December 2017.

When the sources were published

  1. CarNewsChina · pressCarNewsChina (press)
  2. China Daily · pressChina Daily (press)
  3. ScienceDirect (Elsevier) · researchScienceDirect (peer-reviewed, abstract)

Every source, with links ↑

What happened to this record

  1. Sources last read
  2. Entered the record

Every revision, permanent →

Show your work What this page rests on and what it can’t tell you · all 1 claims with their sources · the forensic record

Evidence Passport · public beta 1 addressable claim, 4 source dossiers, one permanent baseline. The passport is unreviewed — an AI-assisted structural migration, not a human or expert endorsement. Every revision keeps a permanent copy under revision history.

Inspect the claims, one by one — verbatim text, sources and caveats for all 1

The text below is copied verbatim from the published record. Each claim names the source dossiers that carry it; caveats stay attached to the claim they qualify.

Claim 1 clm-c5982601249e771d descriptive
its lottery and auction channels distribute the burden of the cap unevenly between applicants
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The academic study analyses the distributional effects of Guangzhou's combined lottery/auction quota system.
Caveat
The full text is paywalled; the anchor rests on the abstract's reported findings.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. ScienceDirect (peer-reviewed, abstract)
Forensic record — source dossiers, gaps, hashes and the exact revision this page renders

This layer records what is known about each source, what is still missing, and the exact snapshot this page is rendering. A missing date, archive or hash stays visible as missing.

unreviewed Revision 2026-08-20-source-dates effective 2026-08-02 · created 2026-08-20

Awaiting operator and domain-expert review; publication of this revision implies neither.

sha256:12e815f95b6e3d9cdc6c35a0025371d83d8ae226d61801f5e90454cba2e64fd6
1
of 1 claims mapped
4
source dossiers
2
publication dates recorded
0
archives linked
0
exact locators
0
content captures hashed

Governance facts carried by the record

Operator
Guangzhou Municipal Small and Medium-sized Passenger Vehicle Quota Regulation and Management Office
Actor types
city-government
Funding model
public
Funding description
Not recorded
Cost
Not recorded
Ownership
Not recorded
Decision rights
Not recorded
Exit conditions
Not recorded

4 source dossiers

CarNewsChina (press) carnewschina.com · background

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-d1dd686d5daef1cc
Publisher
Name not classified · carnewschina.com
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2012-07-11
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-02
Dossier created
2026-08-20
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

2012 policy launch: hybrid lottery+auction quota design, distinct from Beijing/Shanghai.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Background source; no baseline claim points here
China Daily (press) chinadaily.com.cn · background

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-441f751225b435ea
Publisher
Name not classified · chinadaily.com.cn
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2012-08-27
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-02
Dossier created
2026-08-20
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

First lottery results, August 2012 (6,544 winners), confirms lottery launch mechanics.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Background source; no baseline claim points here
Guangzhou Municipal Government (official) gz.gov.cn · background

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-fc5cb35db92f96be
Publisher
Name not classified · gz.gov.cn
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
Not recorded
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-02
Dossier created
2026-08-20
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

November 2025 bidding-round notice: 17,712 indicators allocated, ¥10,000 minimum bid — confirms the system is still live.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Background source; no baseline claim points here
ScienceDirect (peer-reviewed, abstract) sciencedirect.com · 1 linked claim

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-70bd5606f4845564
Publisher
Name not classified · sciencedirect.com
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
Not recorded
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-02
Dossier created
2026-08-20
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Academic study on the distributional effects of Guangzhou's combined lottery/auction system; full text paywalled, abstract and citation confirm findings referenced here.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Known limits of this passport
  • Publisher names and source languages have not yet been classified; domains are recorded without guessing.
  • Existing source notes are descriptive locators, not page- or paragraph-exact citations.
  • A missing archive, publication date or content hash is shown as null rather than inferred.
  • The project-level evidence grade ranks the strongest source in the entry; it is not a truth score for every claim.
📎 Cite this project

1001 Smart Cities (2026). “Passenger Vehicle Quota Lottery & Auction” — Guangzhou, China. The Smart City Atlas. https://1001smartcities.org/projects/guangzhou-vehicle-quota-lottery/ (last verified 2026-08-02). Data: CC BY 4.0.

The underlying data is free to reuse with attribution — see the open data page.

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